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Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation
In 1947, and again in 1959, Congress amended the National Labor
Relations Act to forbid "secondary" union activity. Section 8(b)(4)(B), '
a part of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 prohibits union activity which forces
an employer to cease using, selling, or transporting products of any
other employer. The Landrum-Griffin Acta added Section 8(e),4 which
extends this prohibition to cover agreements or contracts providing for
such cessations. Read literally, the tvo sections would repeal the Wag-
ner Act 5 by banning all union strikes or boycotts, since any of these
activities necessarily forces the cessation of some business. Clearly, Con-
gress intended to proscribe some activity, but there is no reason to
conclude that it intended to emasculate the right to strike. History of
the passage of the sections reveals no precise or even discernible dis-
tinction between permitted and proscribed activities.
Faced with this dilemma, courts have relied upon the sparse congres-
sional history, common law doctrines of secondary boycotts, and their
own wits to fashion a line between prohibited (secondary) activity and
lawfal (primary) activity. The distinction which emerged from twenty
years of decisional law was filled with contradictory reasoning and
judicial hair-splitting. In the past few years, however, confusion has
partially given way to a consistent rationale that seems to reflect the
central concerns of Congress and offers a relatively clear and predict-
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964) reading in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfai labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (4) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged
in commerce ... to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his emplo)lnent to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise . . handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services ... where ... an object
thereof is-(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturers, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or
requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as
the representatives of his employees .. .Provided, That nothing contained in this
clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise lawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing.
2. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
5. abor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519.
4. 29 U.S.C, § 158(e), reading in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cepsq or refrain from handling, using, selling. trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person....
5. 49 Stat. 449 (1935). Section 13 of the Wagner Act, 29 US.C. § 163, preserves the right
to strike; Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157, preserves the right to bargain collectively.
6. See note 42 infra.
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able rule of law.7 Congress apparently desired to limit the disruptive
effects of legitimate employer-employee confrontations and protect
neutral parties from being engulfed in the contest between the dis-
putants for tactical advantage. The new rationale both limits union
demands to those which are necessary to further only the interests of
the bargaining unit, although ancillary effects of the demands are per-
mitted, and limits bargaining unit activity to a direct confrontation
between the immediate parties8 to the dispute, while recognizing that
this confrontation may have side effects.9
Until 1967 the courts had touched only sporadically on the question
whether product boycotts for the purpose of work preservation are
primary or secondary. The previous discussion by courts threw little
light on the problem: it dealt with the scope of legitimate union ac-
tivity in furtherance of traditional labor goals, whereas work preserva-
tion involves the legitimacy of a new union goal. In the few cases to
present the issue, the judges have tended to apply the traditional pri-
mary-secondary rules without regard to the distinguishing character-
istics of the work-preservation situation.
I.
The early work-preservation cases failed even to raise the suggestion
of legitimate primary activity. In Wadsworth'o the Tenth Circuit held
that a strike against the use of prefabricated houses violated section
8(b)(4)(B) on a literal reading of the statutory language forbidding a
refusal to handle goods. Similarly, in General Millwork,11 the Sixth
7. See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Orange Belt
District Council of Painters v. NLR.B, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Ohio Valley Car-
penters Dist. Council (Cardinal Industries), 136 N.L.R.B. 977 (1962), Lesnick, Job Security
and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. Rrv, 1000
(1965); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1086 (1960); Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, 44 MINN. L. RFv. 257 (1959).
8. The immediate parties are the complaining bargaining unit and the employer whose
action will satisfy ultimate union demands.
9. This formula purposely avoids the more traditional and confused language of
secondary boycott reasoning. The linguistic contortions involved in distinguishing "alms,"
"objects," and "hopes" seem of little use. The definition rejects this search for motive and
limits both the scope of demands and activity with reference to the bargaining unit itself,
This covers the two types of secondary behavior: (1) the use of the immediate employer
as a conduit of union pressure to change the labor policy of suppliers or customers;
and (2) the expansion of a primary dispute through tactical pressure upon suppliers or
customers.
10. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950), en.forcing 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 947 (1951).
I1. NLRB v. Carpenters Local 11, 242 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1957), enforcing 113 N.L.R.B.
1084.
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Circuit decided without primary-secondary discussion that a refusal to
handle pre-hung doors in order to enforce provisions in the collective-
bargaining agreement was an illegal stoppage under Section 8(b)(4)(B);
the court merely assumed the agreed-upon clause to be a "hot cargo"
type used in furthering a dispute with the boycotted company, without
asking its purpose or against whom the union had in fact aimed the
stoppage.
Later cases reflected a growing judicial awareness of the primary-
secondary dichotomy and an increasing sense of obligation to justify
8(b)(4)(B) decisions with at least a reference to congressional intent.
Unfortunately, initial recognition of the need to separate permitted
from prohibited activity antedated by about ten years the arrival of a
partially coherent statement of the principle. During the interim courts
grossly misapplied the primary-secondary theory, usually to the dis-
advantage of the union.
A classical abuse of primary-secondary reasoning in the boycott area
involved the "cease doing business" fallacy, in which the courts found
an unlawful secondary objective whenever the strike or boycott led to
a cessation of business. Since any effective strike or boycott forces the
employer against whom it is directed to cease doing some business, the
argument effectively nullified the right to strike. As late as 1958 the
Supreme Court suggested the continuing vitality of such reasoning in
Sand Door,'2 a hot-cargo case arising under Section 8(b)(4)(B) before
the enactment of Section 8(e). Although the facts dearly revealed sec-
ondary behavior and the Court was careful to note that it would not
read the statute to proscribe all strikes, the "cease doing business"
language still appeared without further elaboration.13 Applying the
rule to work preservation, the Ninth Circuit in Sound Shingle14 treated
a union refusal to handle Canadian shingles as secondary without paus-
ing to inquire into the purpose of the refusal or against whom it was
aimed, even though the record suggested a union concern to protect
jobs from foreign competition. And in Joliet Contractor's Association
v. NLRB,' 5 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board's finding of a Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B) violation where glaziers refused to install preglazed
glass in residential construction work. Overruling the admittedly ob-
scure and at times contradictory findings of the trial examiner that the
12. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
13. Id. at 98.
14. NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' Dist. Council, 211 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1954).
15. 202 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1953).
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refusal amounted to primary conduct because intended for work pre-
servation,"6 the court of appeals rejected both this union defense and
the primary-secOndary scheme generally, using instead the cease-doing-
business test.
The staunchest adherent to the cease-doing-business argument has
been the Labor Board itself. In MacDonald-Scott,1 union employees
refused to install prefabricated sections of underground tunnel for
missile silos, claiming a deprivation of traditional jobs. The Board held
the eefusal illegal under Section 8(b)(4)(B) without mentioning regu-
lar primary or secondary matters because of the union intent to sever
the business connection between the contractor and the tunnel section
supplier. The Board found what it termed the "work assignment" ques-
tion inseparable from the illegal product boycott. In another missile
case, Martin Company,'8 the Board resolved an obvious work-preserva-
tion dispute by finding a Section 8(b)(4)(B) violation in the union's
intent to end the use of prefabricated missile launching cables.
By the 1960's the courts had come to reject the cease-doing-business
analysis as a talisman in the area, only to find that they had forcibly
to impress their learning on an unreceptive Board. Where a grocery
clerk's union attempted to preserve supermarket shelving for itself, the
District of Columbia Circuit refused to aiccept the NLRB's finding of
business-cessation motive as an adequate ground for a Section 8(b)(4)(B)
violationJ 0 And in 1964 the Third Circuit had to overrule the Board
and decide that a union refual to allow subcontractors to drill tele-
phone-pole holes with power augers was primary activity2 0
Another mistaken approach, which misled the courts almost as much
as the cease-doing-business test, turned on the language in Section
8(b)(4)(B) which prohibits action "an object" of which is the cessation of
business. In NL" v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Coun-
cil2l the Supreme Court held that where one object of a strike was
secondary, the entire activity was unlawful even if all other objects
Were primary. Since all foreseeable results of the strike were considered
16. Olazler's Local 27, 90 N.LR.B. 542, 554, 555 (1950).
17. Plumbers Local 598, 131 N.LR.B. 787 (1961).
18. Electrical Workers Local 156, 131 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1961).
19. Retail Clerks Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961), remanding 127
N.L.R.B. 1522.
20. NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 325 (Nichols Eled. Co.), 326 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.
1964), remanding 138 N.L.R.B. 540 (1962). The battle continued as the Eighth Circuit had
to strike doWn all NLR.B "cease doing business" ruling in American Boiler Mfg. v. NLRB,
366 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1966), reversing in part 154 N.L.R.B. 285 (1965).
21. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
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"objects" within the statute,22 Denver Building threatened to bar pri-
mary activity whenever it generated ancillary effects-which was to say,
always. Ten years later the Court corrected itself sub silentio in Gen-
eral Electric,23 validating picketing at a gate reserved for independent
contractors. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion dismissed the
disruption of business with the contractors as a natural ancillary result
of the primary picketing not "infecting" the legitimate action. The
picketers "hoped" to halt the business, but that ias not their "ob-
ject."24
Word of the change of emphasis in the General Electric decision
must have been slow to reach the Midwest, however, for three years
later the Seventh Circuit relied on the Denver Building logic to dis-
pose of a work preservation case. In NLRB v. Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 75325 the union was fighting to preserve its right to deliver to
dairies in the Chicago area; the interruption of contract relations
between milk suppliers and dairies was held a secondary object,20 over-
riding any primary work-preservation goals.27
Within the past few years, the courts have come to apply a more
carefully thought-out primary-secondary rationale to the work-pre-
servation cases. The development of stable criteria in identifying sec-
ondary activity has led the judges to distinguish three classes of work-
preservation situations: (1) subcontracting cases, in which the union
seeks to preserve its jobs by limiting the conditions under which the
employer may contract out work; (2) specific job allocation cases, in
which the union insists that tasks or work assignments be reserved for
its members; and (3) product boycott cases, in which the union pro-
motes job security by preventing the introduction of prefabricated
materials.
1. Subcontracting. In a brace of 1964 decisions the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals rejected the existing primary-secondary ap-
proach, differentiated subcontracting from other work-preservation
situations, and established dear criteria for identifying secondary be-
havior in the area. In Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48
22. Id. at 689.
23. Local 761, UEW v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
24. Id. at 673-74.
25. 335 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 328.
27. See also NLR.B v. Local 12, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 293 F.2d 319 (9th
Cir. 1961), enforcing 126 N.L.R.B. 688 (1960). The most recent use of this discredited
theory is by Mfr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n Y. NLRB,
386 U.S. 612, 651 (1967), citing Denver Bldg. Trades and MacDonald-Scott, discused
supra pp. 1404-05.
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v. NLRB,28 the court remanded for further findings by the Board, re-
jecting the agency's determination of a Section 8(b)(4)(B) violation
arrived at without discussion of the purpose of the disputed contract
clause. Judge Wright indicated that a subcontracting clause providing
that only organized plants receive contracted-out work would be sec-
ondary, because it would reach beyond the immediate employer-em-
ployee relationship to promote the status of unions generally without
protecting bargaining-unit jobs. But, he continued, a clause requiring
that subcontracted employees be paid union wages and benefits with-
out regard to union membership would be primary, since it would
affect peripheral parties only to the extent necessary to protect bargain-
ing-unit jobs by removing the employer's incentive to "farm out" work
at lower wages. 20 In Truck Drivers' Local 413 v. NLRB,30 the court
flatly reversed the Board to hold primary a subcontracting clause pro-
viding for union wages and benefits for all hired employees. The court
designated this type of contract term a "union standards" clause ratify-
ing its primary-activity status the following year in Lewis v. NLRB.81
2. Job Allocation. A second area of work-preservation disputes in-
volves specific job allocation or reservation of work. Here the concern
is not the conditions under which the employer may give work to
others, but who within the plant may have the jobs reserved. Union in-
sistence upon the employer's guaranty of work to bargaining-unit mem-
bers, no matter what the consequent disruptive effects upon other
parties, is primary because its effects are ancillary to the direct con-
frontation of primary parties. But a demand for work preservation for
the local or sister unions, regardless of their relationship to the em-
ployer, is secondary because it is not limited to the alteration of a
primary relationship.
Judicial recognition of the job-allocation clause as a special problem
in the work-preservation field appeared in Meat Drivers Local 710 v.
NLRB (Wilson & Co.)32 where the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals allowed meat packing drivers to reacquire and preserve work for
themselves without regard to the serious disruption their demand in-
flicted on meat suppliers. At the same time, the NLRB had adopted a
similar approach to work allocation on its own hook. In contrast to its
28. 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
29. Id. at 538-39.
30. 334 F.2d 539, 548 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
31. 350 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1965), upholding the union standards clause (so named at
801) of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement.
32. 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964) Again Judge Wright pioneered, using the same
prindples he formulated for subcontracting cases.
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recalcitrance and confusion in subcontracting cases, the Board de-
dared in four recent work allocation decisions that reserving work for
bargaining-unit members was primary activity.n
3. Product boycotts. The primary-secondary test in the boycott area
turns on the union's reason for rejecting products. Where the union
turns away all goods threatening or replacing bargaining-unit jobs,
whether or not manufactured by fellow unionists, the disruption is
ancillary to a primary confrontation. But where rejection is limited to
non-union goods, an impermissible practice arises from the boycotters'
efforts to affect a secondary employer-employee relationship.
In 1967 the Supreme Court dealt directly with the questions raised
by product boycotts. 34 National Woodwork Manufacturers Association
v. NLRB,3 5 on certiorari from the Seventh Circuit, involved a strike by
carpenters who, acting pursuant to their collective bargaining agree-
ment, refused to hang pre-fitted doors. In Houston Insulation Con-
tractors Association v. NLRB, 6 a companion case from the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the union refused to handle pre-cut steel bands, invoking its
contract forbidding prefabrication of pipe insulation. Both cases con-
tained substantial evidence that the striking workers were not con-
cerned with the union status of the employees who had manufactured
the prefabricated products, and that they would have rejected such
material from any source.
The main body of the majority opinion in TVoodwork is concerned
with reconciling Section 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). The Court held that Con-
gress had added Section 8(e) to plug a loophole suggested by the Sand
Door3 7 decision: that union contracts with "hot cargo" clauses would
be permissible under 8(b)(4)(B). 38 Both majority and minority in
33. Milk Drivers Local 546 (Minnesota Milk) 133 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1316 (1961); Teamsters
Local 282 (Precon Trucking), 139 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1084 (1962) (decision on other grounds);
Milk Wagon Drivers Local 603 (Drive-Thru Dairy), 145 N.L.1UB. 445, 449 (1963); Dairy
Workers Local 83 (Arthur Elias), 146 N.L.R.B. 716, 722-23 (1964).
34. Before 1967 only one NLRB decision, Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council
(Cardinal Industries), 136 N.L.R.B. 977 (1962). enforced, 339 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1965),
attempted to apply a rational primary-secondary schema to the situation. Although finding
a secondary violation, the Board held that it would have been primary had the union
rejection of supplier materials been motivated by the desire to preserve jobs. Cf. Meat
Drivers Local 710, 143 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1237-42 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Member
McCulloch). The two conflicting circuit court decisions on this point, National Wood-
work Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1966) (ignoring the new rationale) and
Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1966) (using the
new rationale) were resolved by the Supreme Court as discussed infra.
35. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
36. 385 U.S. 664 (1967).
37. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
38. In Sand Door the Court had pointed out in dicta that 8(b)(4)(B) forbade union
activity of a secondary nature unless provided for in contracts allowing union members
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Woodwork agreed that 8(e) should be read in pari materia with 8(b)
(4)(B) and should therefore be limited by the primary-secondary dis-
tinction, even though the section does not contain any explicit provi-
sion to that effect.O
But Woodwork and Houston also considered the problem of pro-
duct boycotts for work-preservation, though here unanimity disap-
peared. The Court's treatment of the issue was distinctly cavalier; in
the midst of surveying judicial construction of section 8(b)(4)(B) and
explaining the significance of the garment-industry's exception from
Section 8(e), Mr. Justice Brennan simply assumed that work preserva-
tion should be treated like all other union behavior-limited only by
the primary-secondary rationale:
[I]f the body of [section 8(e)] ... were construed to prohibit pri-
mary agreements and their maintenance, such as those concerning
work preservation, the proviso would have the highly unlikely
effect, unjustified in any of the statute's history, of permitting gar-
ment workers, but garment workers only, to preserve their jobs
against subcontracting or prefabrication. 40
From that point onward, the Court discusses work-preservation, not
primary and secondary activity in general. It outlines a test for primary
activity in the product-boycott area fully in accord with the solutions
already worked out above for the subcontracting and job-allocation
problems.41 Woodwork thus rounds out the primary-secondary rules
for the major work-preservation areas.42 The attitude it expresses to-
to refuse to handle goods in order to effect a secondary boycott (the "hot cargo" clauses).
357 U.S. at 99.
39. 386 U.S. at 635 (majority), 660 (minority).
40. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 644-46.
42. The majority decision reviews the passage of Section 8(b)(4)(B) and Section 8(e) at
great length, 386 U.S. 623-42, discussing congressional intent regarding secondary activity,
and can find little reference to work-preservation, let alone product boycotts, The Court
thus interprets silence to mean that no action was intended. Justice Harlan brilliantly
summarizes in his concurring memorandum opinion:
We are thus left with a legislative history, which, on the precise point at issue (work
preservation], is essentially negative, which shows with fair conclusiveness only that
Congress was not squarely faced with the problem these cases present. In view of
Congress' deep commitment to the resolution of matters of vital importance to
management and labor through the collective bargaining process, and its recognition
of the boycott as a legitimate weapon in that process, it would be unfortunate were
this Court to attribute to Congress, on the basis of such an opaque record, a purpose
to outlaw the kind of collective bargaining and conduct involved in these cases.
Especially at a time when Congress is continuing to explore methods for meeting the
economic problems increasingly arising in this technological age from scientific
advances, this Court should not take such a step until Congress has made unmistalably
clear that it wishes wholly to exclude collective bargaining as one avenue of approach
to solutions in this elusive aspect of our economy.
386 U.S. at 649-50. It should be noted that the logic of the dissent Is inexplicable: for
1408
Vol. 77: 1401, 1968
Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation
wards work-preservation generally should be taken as a signal to the
lower courts and the Board that the Justices will no longer tolerate
hostility toward the work-preservation form of union activity in the
guise of secondary reasoning.
Not only does the Woodwork decision fill a missing gap in ie judi-
cial construction of Section 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B); it is also consistent
with surrounding decisional law. Most important in this respect is
Fibreboard Paper Product v. NLRB,43 where the Court held that an
employer's contracting-out of work came within the "terms and condi-
tions of employment" of Section 8(d)44 and so was subject to mandatory
bargaining under Section 8(a)(5). 45 It would have been anomalous, to
say the least, for the Court to have held in Woodwork that provisions
over which the employer must bargain under Section 8(d) could not
legally be included in their contracts under Section 8(e).43
IL
Despite Woodwork's confirmation of the primary-secondary rationale
throughout the work-preservation field, lower courts and the NLRB
have yet to apply this rationale to create a consistent body of deci-
sional law; consequently, several areas of serious difficulty remain.
secondary activity generally, sweeping prohibitory language is undermined by obvious
congressional desire to limit banned activity; with boycotts this same language combined
with no evidence of differing intent rests untouched.
43. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) defining collective bargaining and its required scope.
45. 29 US.C. § 158(a)(5), making it an unfair labor practice to refuse to barain col-
lectively. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (19.46), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
46. Fibreboard has been construed to apply to limited situations only. NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), held Fibreboard inapplicable to a larga operational
change in production; NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing, 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 196).
and NLRB v. Burns Intl Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965), both held that
no bargaining was required when a total cessation of business in a productive unit oc-
curred. These decisions leave Fibreboard enforcing mandatory bargaining when relatively
small changes in the employment of manpower are made, i.e., in work-preervation situa-
tions.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), construed a
contract arbitration clause to include binding decisions over contracting out of work
because of the general National Labor Relations Act scheme. 363 U.S. at 584. And Team-
sters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), found that contracting out work to avoid
paying union wage levels was an issue that was subject to required collective bargaining
under Section 8(a)(5). 363 U.S. at 294.
A series of NLRB decisions dealing with compulsory settlement of jurisdictional disputes
under Section 10(k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k), included work-preservation issues. Local 26, Int'l
Fur & Leather Workers, 90 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1950) (work allocation); National Assn of
Broadcast Engineers, 105 N.L.RB. 355 (1953) (work allocation); Local 48, Sheet Metal
Workers Intl, 119 N.L.R.B. 287 (1957) (contracting out to avoid union wage levels). The
Supreme Court relied upon these cases in NLRB v. Radio Engineers Local 1212, 364 U.S.
573 (1961) to hold 10(k) settlement included work allocation disputes which belonged in
the collective bargaining scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. 564 US. at 577,
&- n.12.
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A. Work acquisition
Although no court has yet addressed itself squarely to the issue, past
opinions erroneously suggest that work-acquisition efforts are secondary
per se. Woodwork approached the matter by recourse to a "sword and
shield" analogy;47 and delighted as one might be at this foray into
metaphor, the legal basis for the distinction does not exist. The Court
reasoned that in the case at hand the carpenters had attempted to pre-
serve work they had traditionally done, which action was defensive (a
"shield") and therefore primary. In contrast, the Court said that the
boycotts in Allen Bradley4" had been illegal because the electrical
workers were seeking new jobs-using the boycott offensively (a
"sword"). This is wrong; the boycott in Allen Bradley was secondary
because it was aimed at preserving jobs for workers in another industry,
having nothing to do with whether they were old or new. Further, the
jobs sought had previously been performed by the Local before the De-
pression. As the dissent acidly noted, the sword and shield analogy had
been created out of thin air.49 Even on its own terms, the proposed
sword-shield argument is unpersuasive in its intimation that any seek-
ing after new work is inherently secondary. A union attempt to gain
new work strictly limited to the immediate employer-employee con-
text threatens none of the injury to outside parties that the secondary
prohibition supposedly guards against. The prohibition of job acquisi-
don is an example of courts using a restriction upon the scope of union
activities to ban certain labor goals.
So far, however, the argument that work acquisition should be as-
similated to the general primary-secondary context has been unavail-
ing. The NLRB disapproved the efforts of the Chicago meat drivers
to reacquire jobs lost as businesses moved to the suburbs by characteriz-
ing the union attempt as one to take new work and therefore inher-
ently secondary, even though the employment sought was of the same
nature as that currently performed.r0 The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals reversed on the narrow ground that the union efforts con-
47. 386 U.S. at 630.
48. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, UEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1944).
49. 386 U.S. at 657.
50. Meat Drivers Local 710 (Wilson & Co.), 143 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1963). But see the un-
availing dissenting opinion of Member McCulloch:
m . . Ihe Union may insist on bargaining with the packers with respect to con-
tractual provisions which are designed to retain, reclaim, or obtain work of the type
now being performed by unit members, despite the possibility that a successful in-
sistence in that respect might entail changes in the present relationship between the
packers and the independent haulers [emphasis added]....
Id. at 1237.
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stituted an attempt at "recapture" and accordingly were primary; the
work, it said, fell within the bargaining unit and was fairly claimable,
apparently meaning that the work previously performed must be of
the same general nature and closely related to the present scope of the
bargaining unit activity.5'
The District of Columbia reversal has shaken the Board's attitude
somewhat. Prior to the holding, the Board had been consistently rigid
in its application of the work-acquisition ban. 2 But in United Dairy5
the agency allowed the union the right to perform work newly acquired
by the employer even though formerly performed by non-union men.
And recently the Board has gone further, describing an agreement
"designed to preserve, obtain, or reacquire [work of the] employees in
this unit," as one to preserve work and so "outside the scope of Sec-
tion 8(e)."n
The gravest concern in the work-acquisition area is that the courts
will limit the permissible scope of job acquisition to work that the
unit has traditionally performed.Y If the unit grows stronger and can
move into new productive stages, or if technological change requires
employee retraining, nothing in the primary-secondary rationale jus-
tifies forbidding the union to claim and preserve the jobs.r0
On the other hand, the Board should be careful not to permit the
excuse of work preservation and acquisition to disguise secondary
activity. In International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators,57
where the union defended a charge of boycotting non-union prefab-
ricated pipe covering with a work-preservation rationale, the Board
correctly found a secondary purpose after ascertaining that it was im-
possible for the union's members to perform the work claimed because
they lacked the requisite skills and because the required machinery
51. Meat Drivers Local 710 v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709, 713, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1960). A more
conservative attitude is represented by Highway Truckdrivers Local 107 v. NLRB, -02 F.2d
897 (D.C. Cir. 1962), holding that a cessation of business from the possibility of work
acquisition was enough for a secondary violation.
52. Teamsters Local 282 (Precon Trucking Corp.), 139 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1088 (1962); Milk
Wagon Drivers Local 603 (Drive-Thru Dairy), 145 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963).
53. Dairy Workers Local 83 (Arthur Elias), 146 N.L.R.B. 716 (1964).
54. Pipefitters Local 455, 154 N.L.R.B. 285, 288-89 (1965). modified on other grounds,
sub nom. American Boiler Mfrs. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1966). Cf. Pipefitters
Local 455, 167 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 66 L.R.R.M. 1098 (Sept. 27, 1967); Pipefitters Local 539,
167 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 66 L.R.R.M. 1102 (Sept. 27, 1967).
55. This could result from the conservative use of the jobs "fairly claimable" formula.
See pp. 1410-11 supra; McLeod v. Teamsters Local 282, 241 F. Supp. 831, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
56. If movement to a new area raises jurisdictional problems, section 10(k), 29 U.S.C.§ 160(k), already offers employers protection.
57. 139 N.L.R.B. 688, 701 (1962).
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could not be used at the job site; the only employees capable of doing
the job were lon-unit, non-site workers.68
B. Bargaining-Unit Size
A second area of difficulty involves the limits of the employee group
which the work-preservation agreement may legally protect. At one
extreme, protecting job opportunities in an already-defined bargaining
unit is primary, as reflected in the generally accepted test for "jobs
fairly claimable by the appropriate bargaining unit"; at the other, a
product boycott to preserve jobs for unionism generally is secondary in
that it seeks to cover the working conditions of employees beyond the
immediate employer-employee relationship. Between these extremes,
however, lie numerous pitfalls.
One problem has arisen in the construction industry litigation.
Courts have hinted at limiting protection to the job site, perhaps
because of a mistaken reliance on a Section 8(e) proviso;"0 but the con-
cept of primary activity easily includes a boycott or strike by jobsite
workers to protect the work of offsite members within the same bar-
gaining unit. Unit work is, after all, unit work; and any member liable
to be assigned to a job on or off the site retains a direct interest in pro-
tecting both job opportunities. But the argument goes no further. It
does not permit the unit to insist that the prefabrication be done by a
sister local or a union in general;6 0 the unit must either reserve the
work for itself, or impose no restrictions.
Identity of interest between a national union and its local gives rise
to a second difficulty. In two cases 1 the NLRB has held that a local's
boycott of work done outside the shop was secondary because the na.
tional had initiated it and it furthered the national's goals. Both cases
contained evidence that the local sought to protect jobs outside the
unit and that no unit job was threatened, but the Board's language
went too far. Where the local seeks to prevent a future threat to its
security, even at the urging of a national whose insight into long-term
technological change is probably superior, its conduct is primary un.
58. See also International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators, 139 N.L.R.B. 659 (1962);
International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators, 137 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1962).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e); the first proviso was added to insure that there were no non.
union workers of any employer on the job site.
60. Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Industries), 136 N.L.RB. 977, 986.
87 (1962).
61. Baltimore Lithographers Local 2-P (Alco-Gravure) 160 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 63 L.RM.
1126 (Sept. 22, 1966); New York Lithographers Local 1-P (Alco-Gravure), 160 N.L.1,
No. 91, 63 L.R.R.M. 1129 (Sept. 22, 1966).
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less the employer can adduce evidence of a purpose unrelated to unit
needs. Nothing in the primary-secondary analysis requires the Board
to penalize union foresight or a joint effort to avoid unemployment,
so long as each unit fights for its own jobs.02
A third complication occurs where two unions seek to aid each other
by preserving work offered by the same employer. The Supreme Court
in Houston Contractors63 followed two appellate-court decisions" hold-
ing such conduct primary. There the employer required Local 22 to
make prefabricated insulation in his home shop for use at the jobsite;
the union had negotiated a work-preservation agreement. At the job-
site, Local 113 refused to install prefabricated insulation not made by
Local 22, insisting on the right to enforce Local 22's bargaining agree-
ment by virtue of its own job-security clause in the contract permitting
mutual aid. Although the Court could have rested on the contract pro-
vision, it chose instead to invoke the broader ground that the tradi-
tional right of mutual aid and protection of fellow employees enabled
each employee to come to the assistance of fellow employees of the
same employer even where his own job was not in jeopardy.05 The deci-
sion widens the bargaining unit to comprehend all the employees of
any one employer, without regard to whether the various union locals
actually engage in joint bargaining. Primary-secondary doctrine may
not require such a result; but given the Labor Act's proclivity for a
rough parity in bargaining strength between employer and employee,
it should not preclude such an outcome.
The "area" job protection cases present a fourth, and most trouble-
some, question: whether one unit may protect the jobs of surrounding
units where they all face a common threat and individual employees
frequently shift among them. Primary-secondary analysis apparently re-
quires the courts to inquire into the degree that employer conduct
threatens job security, in order to determine the existence of an "im-
mediate" interest and "primary" concern over another unit's security.
On this point, Allen Bradley looms large; for there two units of one
union in the same city were prevented from aiding each other to re-
acquire lost jobs. In the shadow of Allen Bradley, the NLRB 0 rejected
62. Baltimore Lithographers Local 2-P (Alco-Gravure), 160 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 63
L.R.R.M. 1127, 1129 (dissent).
63. 886 U.S. 664 (1967).
64. NLRB v. General Drivers Local 968, 225 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 350
U.S. 914 (1955); AMilaukee Plywood v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960).
65. 386 U.S. at 668.
66. Retail Clerks Intl Ass'n, 127 N.L.R.B. 1522 (1960), remanded in Part, 296 F.2d 368
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the union defense of primary activity partially on factual findings that
the benefit sought, though local in character, would accrue outside the
bargaining unit. These cases merge with Ohio Valley Carpenters which
established the rule that job preservation for the union as a whole
rather than a unit is secondary. 67
Under the impetus of Woodwork, a sharp break in the Allen Bradley
reasoning has come in the Second Circuit. In NLRB v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 28,63 a New York City local had refused to install air
flow dampers from Milwaukee, insisting on a right to preserve the jobs
for manufacturing members of the City local. The NLRB held the re-
fusal secondary on the ground that it sought benefits for non-bargain.
ing unit members.6 The Second Circuit reversed on the authority of
Woodwork; the absence of a dispute with the Milwaukee employer and
the work-preservation purposes were decisive.
It is not easy to reconcile Sheet Metal Workers and Allen Bradley;
both cases involved a New York City local's boycotting outside materi-
als to insure the jobs of other local members at the manufacturing
stage. The Sheet Metal Workers opinion adduced none of the evidence
that in other contexts has bolstered a finding of primary activity: there
was no suggestion that contractors and manufacturers coordinated their
bargaining activity, that union personnel frequently interchanged jobs,
or that a decline in the local manufacturing level would adversely affect
the union members in the installation unit. As it stands, the case seems
to hold that a bargaining unit is at least as large as the union local; the
court's pointed overlooking of the question whether the boycotters were
preserving bargaining unit jobs indicates that a much looser test for the
unit, and hence for primary activity, is developing. Considering that the
1947 Congress enacted section 8(b)(4)(B) at least partly to overrule the
Supreme Court's Allen Bradley dictum that the union conduct there
would have been lawful but for the conspiracy with local manufactur-
ers, Sheet Metal Workers' contraction of the secondary category makes
for questionable statutory interpretation.
A fifth problem arises where the bargaining unit is of very large size,
as in the multi-employer situation. In NLRB v. Teamsters Local 38,
involving subcontracting clauses, the Ninth Circuit offered the gratuit-
ous observation that "criss-cross" activity, in which one unit enforces
(D.C. Cir. 1961), on remand, 145 N.L.R.B. 307 (1963); Milk Drivers' Union, 141 N.L.RB.
1237 (1963), enforced, 335 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1964).
67. 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 986 (1962).
68. 380 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1967).
69. 156 N.L.R.B. 804, 811 (1966).
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the rights of another in the multi-employer arrangement, violates the
essence of the secondary-activity prohibition.7 0 It was unclear whether
the court referred to the practices actually before it or to "criss-cross"
activity generally; if it had the latter in mind, the cases allowing mutual
aid under one employer go the other way. And in the multi-employer
bargaining unit, contract gains in work-preservation are meaningful
only if all unit members have the power to enforce them by "inside"
boycott pressure.7'
An expansion of the multi-employer concept might be most valuable
in the prefabrication industry. Heat & Frost Insulators prevented the
union from taking offsite jobs performable only in the factory on the
ground that they were not traditional work done by unit members.72
Under present law reservation of these factory jobs for the local is sec-
ondary because aimed beyond the unit. Union insistence upon a rea-
sonable reconciliation of the interests in job security and innovation-
pairing new jobs with displaced employees-is legal only where the
contractor employing the displaced worker and the offsite manufac-
turer of the prefabricated product either are the same employer or
barg-ain jointly with the union. Both situations are highly unlikely. To
the extent that this application of the primary-secondary distinction
prevents unions from securing work in the new process, it exacerbates
industrial tensions and creates unnecessary barriers to solutions of an
important work-preservation problem.
C. Right of control
The employment situation confronting the employee with not one
employer, but layers of them, presents special secondary dangers. The
employees of a subcontractor who strike or boycott to enforce the pro-
visions of their collective bargaining agreement inevitably affect the
general contractor. Is the confrontation directly aimed at the general
contractor, making him a primary party, or is the strike effect ancillary
to the union's quarrel with the subcontractor? Which is the immediate
employer-employee relationship?
Early NLRB cases under section 8(b)(4)(B) 73 established that where-
70. 338 F.2d 23, 28 (9th Cir., 1964).
71. Lewis v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1965). However, Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B.
569 (1964), allowing an employer to exempt himself from clauses of a multi-employer
contract, weakens any such approach.
72. 189 N.L.R.B. 688 (1962). See also Lewis v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 801, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(discussing unit work and different grades of coal produced by separate employers).
73. Longshoremen's Local 1066, 187 N.L.R.B. 45 (1962); International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 187 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962), enforced, 831 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir. 1954). These repeat passing
words from N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688 (1950).
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ever the general contractor had the legal power to satisfy the demands
of the employees while the subcontractor did not, then the general con-
tractor (who has the right of control over the decision) becomes the pri-
mary party, the subcontractor a neutral onlooker, and any strike a
secondary activity. A long line of cases has unhesitatingly applied the
rigid formula.74 Even if this rule were theoretically justifiable, the pos-
sibilities of flagrant exploitation cast doubt on the rule's viability in a
rational world. Consolidated Edison offers an illustrative horrible.15
The power company had contracted with a general contractor, reserv-
ing the right to withdraw any part of the work at any time. Later on,
when union pipefitters charged a violation of their work allocation
rights with the subcontractor, Con Ed immediately withdrew the dis-
puted work and assigned it to a different general contractor. The Sec-
ond Circuit found a union violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B).
After Consolidated Edison one wonders whether the subcontractor
employee should even bother to bargain for work-preservation rights.
The project owner will have no difficulty in writing contract provisions
circumventing union safeguards by withdrawal devices or architectural
specifications requiring prefabricated materials. The subcontractor may
even actively seek such provisions himself.
The notion that the subcontractor lacks control and is a neutral is
probably incorrect as an empirical matter; it certainly is undesirable
as a conclusion of law when its results lead to such an emasculation of
union rights. As Mr. Justice Douglas once noted in dissent:
The presence of a subcontractor does not alter one whit the re-
alities of the situation; ... [a contrary construction of] the Taft-
Hartley Act makes the right to strike, guaranteed by section 13,
dependent upon fortuitous business arrangements that have no
significance so far as the evils of the secondary boycott are con-
cerned.7 6
The modem primary-secondary analysis requires the complete aban-
donment of the present "right of control" rule.7 The unit has bar-
74. Journeymen Local 636 v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Journeymen
Local 5 v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert denied 375 U.S. 912 (1963); Ohio Valley
Carpenters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1964); American Boiler Mfrs. v. NLRB,
366 F.2d 823.
75. NLRB v. Pipefitters Local 638, 285 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1960).
76. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 US. 675, 693. Sec also the
dissent of Member Brown in Journeymen Local 5, 137 N.L.R.B. 828, 836 (1962).
77. One writer has suggested that the involvement of the subcontractor in bargaining
over these issues should serve to remove his sanctuary as a secondary party. Lesnick, stipra
note 7, at 1038. This is too timid. The subcontractor is primary, the general contractor
secondary, and a strike upholding bargained-for rights and halting the subcontractor's
work (whatever the ancillary effect) is legal.
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gained for its rights and signed a contract with its employer, who
happens to be a subcontractor. These two are without doubt the pri-
mary parties. The general contractor is removed from this direct con-
frontation, enters into the picture after the agreement has been made,
receives his authority over job placement of the complaining unit
derivatively from the subcontractor, and is fully aware of the con-
sequences of such work-preservation agreements. The effects upon the
general contractor of any strike in this situation are thus ancillary to
a primary dispute with the immediate employer vindicating bargain-
ing unit concerns. This result is required if the right to strike is to be
assured to subcontractor's employees.
This reasoning, furthermore, requires no special hardships: the gen-
eral contractor has adequate notice; machinery exists to mediate any
dispute over work between subcontracting units; and the subcon-
tractor is merely estopped from assigning to another party the rights
he guaranteed to his own employees.
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